California Should Take Its Business to Community Banks

(This op-ed originally appeared in the Sunday Insight section of San Francisco Chronicle on Sunday, February 14, 2016).

U.S. banks recently surpassed $200billion in fines, penalties and settlements for their misbehavior and fraud related to the 2008 financial crisis. The vast majority of these cases has involved the country’s biggest banks, but thousands of U.S. banks played no role in the fraudulent and criminal activities that led up the financial crisis. It is time for us to embrace the strong tradition of community banking for California’s government bank accounts and stop rewarding big banks that mistreat their customers and abuse our trust.

In the months leading up to the financial crisis, banks engaged in a range of predatory practices: deceptive marketing, inappropriate billing, rigging of benchmark interest rates, manipulation of the foreign exchange market, mortgage and mortgage-backed securities fraud, municipal bond rigging, and discrimination against minority buyers — to name just some of the misdeeds that regulators and criminal justice authorities have discovered.

California Attorney General Kamala Harris has been a national leader in the fight to penalize banks for their actions, and helped to spearhead the National Mortgage Settlement, a joint state-federal settlement from five major banks — Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo — relating to their marketing and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities. After harming Californians, these banks agreed to provide various forms of relief to consumers on both the principal and interest payments of their mortgages.

Despite the top criminal justice official of our state penalizing these banks for defrauding our citizens, these banks still get to do business with the state of California. Throughout the year, the state of California’s bank accounts have cash balances of billions of dollars a day.

John Chiang, the state treasurer, maintains California’s bank accounts with eight banks, including all three that were part of the National Mortgage Settlement. California should not be holding its money at these banks, which have been found, by our own attorney general, to have defrauded our citizens.

Deposits are the lifeblood of banking. They are the raw materials with which banks make loans. As we place the state’s deposits into banks, we are supporting those banks and their activities. California taxpayer dollars should only be used to support those banks that have been working to improve Californians’ financial lives, not destroy them. The only bank out of the eight the state does business with that meets that qualification seems to be San Francisco’s Westamerica Bank.

The state has no lack of alternate banking options: More than 100 banks have a branch in the Golden State. Most of them are local banks serving their community without incident before, during and after the financial crisis. Treasurer Chiang should spread the state’s money to these community banks. Doing so will reward them for good behavior and give them additional resources to help support loans to small businesses and local citizens throughout the state.

Big bankers will argue that that the small banks couldn’t handle the load or get the statewide coverage the treasurer’s office needs to conduct business. Neither is true: It would be easy to set up a network of small community banks to provide the state’s necessary depository coverage. And while there will be some administrative overhead of moving away from the big banks — as the treasurer will spread taxpayer dollars across more, smaller, community banks — modern technology will keep costs marginal.

Off-the-shelf technology solutions, likely already in use at the treasurer’s office, will provide everything we need. I’ve seen these tools in action — I built and sold a financial technology startup to Silicon Valley Bank (which, for the record, has no government business, and is not to my knowledge interested in any). Turns out that the “little guys” can do everything the big ones can — with far fewer shenanigans along the way.

The gains of leaving these big banks behind are clear: We punish fraudsters, support local banks, create financial opportunity across the state, and reward the good guys. The treasurer should act immediately. He needs no legislative action or outside approval. With so many good California banks, he should no longer direct our funds to bad ones.

Zachary Townsend is a partner with the Truman Project and the director of direct channels at Silicon Valley Bank, which he joined as the co-founder of Standard Treasury, a Silicon Valley startup that seeked to simplify banking technology. The views expressed here are his own. To comment, submit your letter to the editor at www.sfgate.com/submissions.

Analyzing Some (Miscited) Entrepreneurship Research

My background

While I was growing up my Dad was a postal clerk. Being a mailman is a decent blue collar job, all-in-all, and we were fine financially. But when I was twelve or thirteen, my Dad took a huge risk.

An avid reader, a curious soul, he felt stifled by his work. My Dad filled our house with books and our weekends always included a trip to the local library. He got an Associates degree by night, and then got a grant from (the NJ?) Department of Labor to go get a BA full-time. He quit his job. He spent all of his savings, retirement and otherwise, on graduating with a 4.0 GPA from Rutgers. Passionate about research, he went on to get an MA and PhD. He raised me through my high school years on his stipend alone. Coupon-cutting and free school lunch got us through those years. 

Through this time, my mother was completely out of the picture: I didn't see her between ages 10 and 18. Having said that, she's spent most of her career working in restaurants though: server, cook, etc.  

But it all seems worth it. My dad taught me that taking risks in pursuit of one's dreams was worthwhile, even at a deep economic expense. Since then, the post-great-recession era has not created the best academic market. My Dad has oscillated between short-term academic posts and unemployment. 

Needless to say, neither of my parents comes from any serious money. I didn't fall backwards in to a trust fund. Yet somehow I found a way to be an entrepreneur.

Entrepreneurs come from families with money?

Because of that fact, I was annoyed by the framing and conclusion of this article in Quartz "Entrepreneurs don’t have a special gene for risk—they come from families with money". Although the article is nearly a month old, it's sloppiness bothered me and it's holier-than-thou (counter-cultural?) argument against entrepreneurs is becoming more prevalent. That's fine, lot's of entrepreneurs are entitled, arrogant people — so are many journalists — but I find referring to large communities monolithically so commonplace, and so annoying, that I wrote this short essay.

The article makes a common mistake in journalist reflections of academic research: it turns a statistical fact ("On average, and holding all else equal, entrepreneurs are more likely to have received a gift or inheritance") and turn it into a categorical fact. The absolute divisions make better copy, sure, but reality is messy. I could likely spend my whole life pointing out these types of errors, but this particular instance got under my skin because I'm a fine but by-no-means-atypical counterexample to the "all entrepreneurs come from family money" claim.

The article is so poorly written on so many fronts that maybe I shouldn't be so upset. It convolutes so many different arguments, and makes so many different arguments that sound the same but are not. I do not come from a family with any financial stability. On the other hand, I am white, male, and highly-educated. "Earned" or unearned, I have a huge amount of privilege, pedigree, and connections.[1] I was able to take risks that many people couldn't because of these facts, but it does a disservice to suggest that all the people in a group share the same characteristics. If the author had just written the word "most" or "more than average", etc., then the article would have been well on its way to accuracy. 

The research on entrepreneurship that the article cites is interesting though and it points to some deeper policy points than throwing up your hands and saying you have to come from money to be an entrepreneur. I'm going to write a different article in the future about policy prescriptions, but let me analyze the four research citations given related to entrepreneurship.

Blanchflower and Oswald, "What Makes An Entreprenuer?", 1998.

Linked to from this sentence in the article: "But what often gets lost in these conversations is that the most common shared trait among entrepreneurs is [access to financial] capital—family money, an inheritance, or a pedigree and connections that allow for access to financial stability. "

 Four conclusions from this study:

  1. "consistent with the existence of borrowing constraints on potential entrepreneurs, we find that the probability of self-employment depends markedly upon whether the individual ever received an inheritance or gift"
  2. "when directly questioned in interview surveys, potential entrepreneurs say that raising capital is their principal problem"
  3. "consistent with our theoretical framework's predictions, the self-employed have higher levels of job and life satisfaction than employees"
  4. "childhood personality measurements and psychological test scores are of almost no help in predicting who runs their own business later in life. It is access to start-up capital that matters."

Let's dive in here though. Firstly, the study uses the National Child Development Study (NCDS): "a longitudinal birth cohort study that takes as its subjects all those living in Great Britain who were born between the 3rd and the 9th March, 1958". Before I say anything else about this study, might it be that there are differences between the UK and the US? Those inheritances might have had a larger impact in that society at that time than they might in the US now? That there might be large differences in these facts for between people born in 1958 and 1988?

Putting all that aside, although people who received an inheritance of over GBP5000, the cut-off in their analysis, are twice as likely to be self-employed, most self employed people did not receive a big inheritance. In fact, there are more self employed people who received absolutely no inheritance (1,142) than there are people who received over GBP5000 (692) altogether! [2] If you took a random entrepreneur from the data and asked the question in reverse than Blanchflower and Oswald [1998] does -- how likely are you to have received an inheritance -- the data shows the opposite of the Quartz article's claim.

So, the study cited does not support the sentence that links to it.

Ernst & Young, "Nature or nurture? Decoding the DNA of the entrepreneur"

Linked to from this sentence in the article: "While it seems that entrepreneurs tend to have an admirable penchant for risk, [it’s usually that access to money] which allows them to take risks."

To quote the study, "In the struggle to build momentum and grow their businesses, survey respondents and interviewees agree that founders face three main challenges: funding, people and know-how. And of those three, the biggest obstacle is funding." No doubt that it's true, raising money is difficult. But the citation says nothing about the article's central claim that entrepreneur come from money or have easy access to it. You might well conclude the opposite: so many entrepreneurs note that funding is their biggest obstacle so they must not have access to huge pools of family money or easy cash from connections.

Xu and Ruef, "The myth of the risk-tolerant entrepreneur", 2004.

Linked to from this sentence in the article: "While it seems that entrepreneurs tend to have an admirable penchant for risk, it’s usually that access to money which [allows them to take risks.]"

This is a particular egregious citation. It suggests, on my initial reading, that the linked to article would show that access to money allows entrepreneurs to take risks. The study has nothing to do with that claim! It doesn't relate to the argument one bit. The goal of this article is to "investigate whether entrepreneurs can be assumed to be more risk-tolerant than the general population". Their conclusion: Entrepreneurs are not more risk-tolerant. They found business organization for "non-pecuniary" reasons, like being their own boss. They are in fact more risk-averse because they're trying to peruse profits quickly so they can "lower the risk of business closure" and stay as their own boss. Xu and Ruef [2004] doesn't talk about the backgrounds of entrepreneurs at all, family or otherwise.

Levine and Rubinstein, "Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do They Earn More?", 2013.

Paragraph from the article: "University of California, Berkeley economists Ross Levine and Rona Rubenstein analyzed the shared traits of entrepreneurs in a 2013 paper, and found that most were white, male, and highly educated. “If one does not have money in the form of a family with money, the chances of becoming an entrepreneur drop quite a bit,” Levine tells Quartz.

This study is the one that’s closest to supporting the central claim of the Quartz piece, but, again, the categorical nature of the claims is not supported in the empirics — or in Professor Levine's comments. On family background: mothers' education tends to be one year longer (12.6 vs. 11.7 years) for the incorporated self-employed (Levine and Rubinstein's proxy for entrepreneurship[3]), stable two-parent families are true for 83% of entrepreneurs vs. 76% in the general population, and average income for the family is 13k higher, which is a lot (70k vs. 57k). They also do tend to be whiter (83% vs. 70% of the population in the study), more male (72% vs. 52% of the population of the study), more educated by a half year (14.2 years vs. 13.8 in the general population), and slightly more college educated (36% vs. 30% in the general population). The study has some really interesting logit estimates on the probabilities of all of these things, but I'm not going to go in to all that.

I agree that the research here shows that most entrepreneurs are white, male, and highly educated (for some definition of that). But part of the point of all this is to say that statistical significance is not a proxy for actual significance. Saying in an academic paper that the backgrounds of entrepreneurs have more privilege than average, with the numbers plainly available to see, is one matter. Writing a sensational gotcha article that claims that "entrepreneurs ... come from families with money" feels like another.

This isn't even the big take-way from the article though: the big takeaway is that even when you control for whiteness, and richness, and maleness, it still takes something else to be an entrepreneur. We live in a racist, sexist, classist society, I don't think anyone doubts that, but the takeaway from this study — which is almost exactly what the Quartz article is trying to dismiss, is that:

as teenagers, the incorporated tend to have higher learning aptitude and self-esteem scores. But, apparently it takes more to be a successful entrepreneur than having these strong labor market skills: the incorporated self-employed also tend to engage in more illicit activities as youths than other people who succeed as salaried workers. It is a particular mixture of traits that seems to matter for both becoming an entrepreneur and succeeding as an entrepreneur. It is the high-ability person who tends to “break-the-rules” as a youth who is especially likely to become a successful entrepreneur.

Conclusion

There are also some big problems with the datasets looked at, which tend to be longitudinal in nature: they leave out the thriving entrepreneurial spirit in, for example, immigrant communities. To be in the two studies cited above which have serious data, you had to be born in the UK or live in the US at a young age, respectively. That data just does not account for a lot of the entrepreneurship I see. 

Sometime next week, I hope, I'm going to come back to this train of thought and articulate policy ideas around encouraging more entrepreneurship given the observations in these studies. 

Footnotes

[1] "Privilege" can end up an endless enumeration, but let me mention a few others: my vaguely being a Christian is I think not irrelevant, along with my being American (I felt fairly comfortable where I grew up and in all communities I have been part of, well, except Brown to start, but that's a different story); my being cisgender has helped me fit in with men in positions of power; my father valued education which is a privilege, etc. 

[2] This is basic Bayes Theorem reasoning. The conical example is usually given in terms of a medical test. Let's say you have a test that is 99% accurate but a disease that exists in 1% of the population. You use this test on a million people. 10,000 of them actually have the disease of which 9,900 are correctly identified as having the disease and 100 are not. 990,000 people do not have the disease, of which 9,900 are falsely identified as having the disease and 980,100 are correctly identified as not having the disease. So, if I get a negative result from the test, I can be pretty sure I don't have the disease (only 100/980,200 false negatives). But, if I have a positive result, there is only a 50/50 shot I actually do have the disease (9,900/19800)!

[3] This is an imperfect proxy, obviously. 

Standard Treasury Joins Silicon Valley Bank

We're proud to say that Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) has acquired the assets and team of Standard Treasury. More information can be found in the press release

Dan and I started Standard Treasury a little more than two years ago because we saw that APIs would become the dominant way that commercial clients connect with their financial institutions. Since then we have had the honor to collaborate with leading bank's in the US and Europe in their goal of creating open APIs for their customers. We have also worked with hundreds of start-ups around the world to understand how they consume banking services and how doing so over secure RESTful APIs would dramatically improve their business processes.

Last year we decided that the best way to bring the Standard Treasury vision to fruition was to build our own bank. That's a big dream. Earlier this year, primarily because of concerns around regulatory and geographic risks, we were unable to raise a Series A funding round against that goal. With that door closed, we decided the next best thing was to closely align ourselves with one bank, in order to build a richer, more full featured, set of API based services for customers. The more we learned about SVB, the more we believe this partnership will be a faster, better, way to create the impact that we sought to create. 

We've been working with SVB since almost the very beginning of Standard Treasury. Bruce Wallace, Megan Minich, Seth Polansky, and numerous others at the bank have been some of our strongest advocates. When Bruce approached us about being acquired earlier this year, we knew that SVB would be an ideal partner. SVB is the bank of the innovation economy and we couldn't be happier to join them in making their vision of a global digital bank for the world's most innovative companies a reality.

We are proud of the great technology we have built and the positive feedback we got in private user sessions: APIs for payments and account information, a developer dashboard, a range of SDKs, and AML and transactional fraud detection tools for the volumes that we expected our API to handle. We are looking forward to transforming these products for the SVB context and launching some versions of them. We want to thank our past and present team — Brent Goldman, Keith Ballinger, Mike Clarke, Jim Brusstar, Erin Odenweller, Chris Dean, and W. David Jarvis. They were the true creators of our products. 

The past two years have been quite the ride and we are so grateful for the many people that support our efforts: Y Combinator, Index, RRE, Columbia Nova, Susa, Promus, and all the angels believed in Dan and I when we were only a powerpoint deck. The FinTech Innovation Lab, and specifically Maria Gotsch, gave us an incredible platform for sharing our vision with the world.

We're looking forward to continuing to push forward the future of financial services and will have lots to share (and show) in the coming months. 

Dan and I wrote this post collaboratively.

What Business Is Square In Exactly?

Square has reportedly confidentially filed for an IPO under the JOBS act (BloombergWSJ, etc).

In response to the announcement and long before there has been a lot of skepticism about Square's core credit card processing business model. Even with thirty billion dollars a year in processing, running a large engineering, product and design organization on top of such a low-margin business has lead to large losses. I've written in that past that Credit Card Processing is a Hard Business and about Credit Card Processing as a Commodity Business

As a contrast, with Stripe's recent announcement of Visa's investment, a number of outlets reported that they're doing approximately the same volume as Braintree's $20B. Their press site says they're at 270 people as of May. It's not hard to imagine Stripe with that leverage being profitable. Square has, in my sniffing around, roughly ten times as many people as Stripe with only 50% more processing.[1]  

Obviously Square does not perceive their business to be that of merchant acquirer and credit card processor. That is, the old model that Stripe and Square were two sides of the same coin, one card-present and the other card-not-present, does not make sense any more. The differences between them are only increasing. 

Square As The Small Business Operating System

I have theorized previously that Giving Credit Card Processing Away might be an effective way to build a big business. Square has done just that. Square created an cloud-based OS platform for their merchants by effectively giving away credit card processing and then cross selling their customers first party apps that tie into the point-of-sale and card-reader solutions. 

Specialization is a virtue in corporate planning. Square lists sixteen products on their site and people assume they aren't specialized. 

Product specialization is frequently cited as the best way to build a business. The argument goes that businesses usually get big on their singular excellence in one product: even broadly defined. ZenPayroll and Zenefits are providing payroll and employee/benefit management, respectively, better than Square could ever do. 

Square looks like a company that will throw anything at the wall to see what sticks. My reading though is that they specialized in one customer set. That's the internal rationale for all their products — "we're the one stop-shop for (very) small businesses".  I'll admit that some of their products feel a little afield, Caviar in particular. But in the finance space, customer segment specialization is common even when offering a number of different products: American Express and the high-end consumer, Capital One and subprime, Lending Club and subprime, Earnest or Sofi and high-end millennial, LendUp and subprime. 

To me, Square is building an interesting cross between how many finance companies operate and how many technology companies operate. They're cross-selling to a particular market segment with a loss-leader. 

This actually isn't that dissimilar than the business models of most retail banks. You get a demand deposit account, which really doesn't make them very much money, on the idea that they'll cross-sell you other financial products in their supermarket. 

Square is actually even better off because their supermarket of products are mostly high-margin technology products, something that banks often try to emulate but fail at. Email marketing, invoicing, payroll, employee management, appointments are SaaS businesses, with the margins to match.

There are a lot of small businesses in the world where one holistic solution is the right one. Maybe some of those businesses graduate to better tools, but most businesses aren't startups: they don't see radical growth. They go slow and steady and peak as "life-style" businesses. Just this morning I was at Philz Coffee, where I was rung up on a Square register. Philz is growing rapidly and maybe they'll need bigger and more complicated tools, but I bet you could run that business still today completely within the Square ecosystem. 

Taking Square Capital As An Example

I want to focus down on Square Capital as prototypical of their business model moving forward.

Factoring (selling invoices or receivables at a discount) and invoice discounting (borrowing against invoices or receivables) are big businesses. Historic ones too. Although I'm not an expert on the history, I've heard it said that these two tools were some of the first financial and banking products to exist ever. Some models of the development of money markets start with these tools. But I digress, invoice discounting is something frequently used by corporate treasurers to manage liquidity, their cash position, and even, yes, make certain capital investments. 

Traditional banks and factors are not very good at originating business from small- or micro- businesses. It just doesn't make sense within the context of their costs of acquisition and, even more acutely, their cost of underwriting to work with these businesses. A number of startups have cropped up recently within this market. Kickpay, Fundbox, Bluevine, etc. Let us stipulate theses companies are smart enough to build a great product and to acquire users cheaply, the biggest difficulty for these new entrants is verifying data, identifying the merchant, and ascertaining their credit worthiness. One can often make very good money on these collateralized loans but only if you can underwrite correctly. 

Enter Square. Fifteen of their sixteen products produce data on merchants: their activities, their growth, their sales, their employees, the number of appointments they have, the number of deliveries their making, and on, and on. Capital can effectively make high-margin returns on that data by deploying what amounts to invoice discounting against future credit card receivables. The program is young. They've only deployed $100M in Capital. But even if none of their other businesses made any money, they could get a Lending Club style P/E ratio (still 73 despite getting pounded in the markets) by doing a larger, much smarter, much more data-driven version of OnDeck's business.[1] 

If that's the case, Square would be a great business. It just won't be the one we thought it was.

Bullish on Square

And that's just one product line! I leave it as an exercise for the reader to repeat the analysis through all of Square's products one-by-one. Some of them are duds. But enough of them are winners. They're fast-growing, high-margin businesses built on top of a simple premise: let's make card processing cheap and then cross-sell.

I'm eager to read Square's S-1. I think they might have a tumultuous IPO and a difficult roadshow given people's perception of their business but, in the long-term, I'm bullish on their prospects.  

...

[1] These two businesses are actually really different not just in their target market but in how they source their capital and manage it on their balance sheet, but that's not particularly important here. 

Standard Treasury's Series A Pitch Deck

We have some news upcoming about Standard Treasury. But before that...

Almost every week, I get thank you notes for publishing our YC application. It is one of my most viewed blog posts ever. Those notes remind me over the large, supportive community of entrepreneurs. It's been one of the more heartwarming lessons about running an early stage company: there is a supportive conspiracy between all founders against the world (and, well, investors in particular).

That support — of lessons learned, or how to improve your pitch, or tidbits on investor's quirks, or how to manage psychology, or how to fail — is often private but is sometimes public. Whether its about a second seed round, laying off a large part of the team, or selling your company, many founders are quite generous about passing their learnings forward, good or bad.

One thing I found very useful while fundraising was to look at published fundraising decks, both successful and unsuccessful (MixpanelDwolla, and LinkedIn come to mind on the successful side). Since almost all of the "ideas" from our deck have published elsewhere, either on our website or in the Standard Treasury as Bank post, we decided to publish our Series A deck. It's imperfect (slide 7 is inaccurate, we got asked a thousand times to explain slide 14 (it's in '000s), the appendixes tend to be too long, we did not focus enough on the already built product), but Dan and I think it might be instructive for others.

In time, we'll be able to talk more about this process and the things that did and didn't work. Lots of lessons learned. To start though, here is the deck. 

My Brief Time Fighting Human Trafficking

At Y Combinator Alumni Demo Day, I had a chance to talk to the co-founders of Rescue Forensics (who have a fascinating backstory). I learned a lot about their analytics tools for law enforcement while we talked at length about our shared backgrounds in fighting human trafficking. They are doing a lot more work on the topic now, obviously, and much better work than I ever did.

It got me thinking about my work against trafficking in college, which also came to mind twice in recent weeks: once when I had a discussion with SF Supervisor Katy Tang about her work against it in the city and the recent breakdown in the US Senate over the reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVTP). I thought I would briefly share my work with Polaris Project as well as both the British and US governments, and what I learned from these experiences. 

Starting with the Polaris Project

When I was a child, I had a brief interaction with the child welfare system. While I was at Brown, in Rhode Island, I began to think more about that experience. At the same time, I was becoming engaged with the Swearer Center, which puts forward a model of service based on sustained commitment and engagement. 

I started doing research for a professor I was close with in late 2005, who does a lot of work study responses to child abuse. He was asked to write an encyclopedia article on how child abuse laws differ across countries. Helping with that research, I find it pretty difficult to figure out the laws in other countries but learned a lot about the 2000 Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women And Children. I became fascinated by the problem, if confused by the terminology. Trafficking doesn't involve movement, just any situation of exploitation through, what the TVPA would later call, force, fraud, or coercion. 

Right around that time, Polaris Project and its founding story were featured on the cover of the Brown Alumni Magazine. Polaris was built by two Brown graduates and now stands as one of the preeminent anti-trafficking organizations in the country, with a strong focus on domestic trafficking. They now even run the National Human Trafficking Resource Center and the national 24-hour hotline. 

But back then, it was really just ten people who were fighting the good fight and getting a lot of recognition for it. I reached out wondering if I could come work for them in the summer of 2006. They thought that sounded like a great idea but they had an alternative: how about I help organize Polaris Project Rhode Island. 

This sounded like an amazing opportunity, so I went down to DC for a week, got trained by the two co-founders on everything I had to know, and then tried to work on the problem in Rhode Island. Derek, one of the co-founders, told me that I had to be prepared for the fact that with just the week of training, I might be one of the expert on the topic in Rhode Island. I didn't believe him, but it ended up be more true than I could have possible imagined. 

Working for Polaris Project

When I became the co-coordinator of Polaris Project Rhode Island, I believed that getting legislation passed would be easy. On the one hand, I learned how naive I was, while on the other, Rhode Island proved to be a manageable microcosm for policy and politics. It's a world where it's pretty straightforward to meet all the interested parties. I wanted a meeting with the Governor's office, I just called them up. Things don't quite work that way in bigger states. 

We gave lectures to community groups all over RI and built an email list numbering in the thousands. We created a working group with the Providence Police, the International Institute of Rhode Island (for language interpretation), and the Sexual Assault & Trauma Resource Center to raid illegal brothels and provide services to the sex trafficking victims. We helped organized twelve non-profits to band together and form the Rhode Island Coalition against Human Trafficking with over forty community members, and I was honored to be elected a co-chair. Reaching out to coalition volunteers, we organized the group into three committees — public education, legislation and service provision — and began work on raising awareness.[1]  

Ultimately, our greatest victory was getting a state law passed providing provisions on prosecution of human trafficking and victim protections. For over a year, fellow volunteers and we lobbied most state legislators directly and secured the endorsement of the Governor, the Attorney General, and a number of mayors. Despite all that I thought there would be little resistance; no one is “for” trafficking. I drew up a lengthy bill with the Polaris Project Attorney. Yet, other anti-trafficking and anti-prostitution bills[2] were introduced, confusing the issue. There was also strong resistance from the RI ACLU and other organizations about the bill's creating new felonies. Ultimately, a compromise was reached and a shorter version of the bill I helped author was passed. Making trafficking a statewide issue by getting a short bill passed was a satisfying effort that, I think but am not sure about, led to the much bigger fight in 2009 around these issues, which I played no part in. 

Internships around international human trafficking

My focus at Polaris Project has been on state and national policy issues, but human trafficking is a global problem, so I extended that experience by spending two summers interning at government agencies that work against human trafficking on more international scales. 

The first summer, I had a Liman Undergraduate Public Interest Fellowship to work at the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre. While working there I learned about operations, legal practices and cross-agency cooperation within the British Government and its work with European allies. I got to travel all over Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, to see how the British were trying to prevent the sourcing of trafficking victims before they ever reached the UK. I also got to work on building a number of academic networks across the UK. 

The second summer, I worked at the US Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking In Persons. I got to work on addressing the widespread use of forced labor in the Thai and Bangladeshi shrimp processing industries and the use of child labor in West Africa cocoa farming, staffing a cabinet-level task force on human trafficking, and conducting a bunch of research related to various reports and fact sheets. 
 
What I learned from my work against human trafficking

By the end of my time at Brown, I felt burned out by working against human trafficking. It’s a hard topic to talk about day in, day out. It’s draining. I think that human trafficking is some of the worst suffering that exists in this world, which is exactly why I saw it as the natural extension and logical end to my interest in child welfare. 

A lot of my anti-human trafficking work in Rhode Island felt like it was helping particular people (in a local, personal way), but working for two governments taught me that there was an opportunity to help even more people — if I could figure out how to make governments function better. Good, on a larger scale, was possible. I started to think about how one could make more policy changes, even small ones, that effected many people's lives. From that idea, I went on to work for Bennett Midland — but that's a different blog post — where I worked on several policies and programs at NYC's Administration of Children's Services, effecting the services provided to tens of thousands of children and families in the City. 

Footnotes

[1] One nice thing about this experience was that PPRI basically became my college job. Through winning things like J.W. Saxe Prize, and some other Brown fellowships, it was the greatest work-study job I could have hoped for in retrospect.  
[2] At the time, and I obviously am not an official spokesman of Polaris Project, I basically avoided any position on prostitution. It's a topic that elicits strong responses. Prostitution, sex workers, freedom, victimization, etc, are often polarizing flash points, especially so between the various factions of the anti-trafficking community. To square that circle, Polaris had an exclusive focus on exploitation: I don't know whether prostitution should or should not be illegal, but I know that a lot of prostitution is forced and that certainly should be illegal. 

Why I am Switching To Posthaven

I have posted on my blog exactly twenty times since September 2013 when Dan and I and Standard Treasury got out of Y Combinator and raised our seed round. Some of the posts have been quite business related while others have been deeply personal. 

All in all, I've had a couple hundred thousand uniques on the blog (my most popular post is about weight loss). Recently I got concerned about Svbtle, the blogging platform I was using. Svbtle is the brainchild of Dustin Curtis, and it's pretty well-designed. But it seems like a side project, and I just don't know much about its long-term viability. 

So, I have decided to switch over to Posthaven

My reasons: 

(1) Permanence. I believe that Posthaven, my content, and my links will be here a long time. The pledge says forever, but a decade or two would be nice.  

(2) Inexpensive. Five dollars a month is pretty damn cheap. I am also actually more comfortable paying for something than not: I know they're covering their costs.

(3) Trust. I know Garry personally through my time in YC. I trust that the pledge is real and he always try to do the right thing by us users. 

What I lose:

(1) Time. Posthaven doesn't seem to take markdown, so I had to convert all my markdown to HTML. There are some other basic administrative annoyances. 

(2) Kudos. On Svbtle, if someone enjoyed your post they could give you "Kudos". On Posthaven they can "Upvote". For good reason, I can't set the number of upvotes myself, so that's all gone. 

Standard Treasury as a Startup Bank

At Standard Treasury we are building an API banking platform, becoming our own bank, and doing so in the United Kingdom. I want to address these three aspects of our work and also talk about the long-term social potential for our bank.[1] 

Banking as a platform 

Over the last six years, we have seen a proliferation of startups at the application layer of banking. Some examples include LendingClub, OnDeck, Braintree, Stripe, WePay, Betterment, Wealthfront, Osper, TrueLink, Angelist, Seedrs, GoCardLess, FutureAdvisor, Square, LendUp, etc. 
 
Behind each one of those institutions is a bank. Sometimes these are big banks like Wells Fargo or JP Morgan, while sometimes they are small banks like BanCorp or WebBank. At either size, the technology is terrible at these banks. The interfaces which one has to deal with are foolishly designed, risk and compliance management are often done by hand, and the entire infrastructure often uses legacy technology that makes speed, consistency, and reliability very difficult. 
 
We are building the programatic banking platform which should underlie the new, growing application layer of finance. We want to be the Amazon Web Services of banking. Our wholesale commercial banking infrastructure will be unknown to most of the public, but it will power some of the biggest applications and companies in the world. 

Becoming a bank 

We must be our own regulated, deposit-taking institution in order to build the platform and product we are planning. We have to own the entire regulatory and technology stack.

On the regulatory front, we will be foot-forward on things like risk management, AML detection, sanction-list referencing, etc. We need to understand what our partners are doing and build our technology to work to underwrite and manage our risk. We have to understand our customers (specifically financial technology startups), so that we can help regulators understand our customers. In short, we have to be a purpose built communications layer between our partners and everyone else — including regulators and payment systems. Today, bankers are doing a bad job of this. (In fact, regulators have hit a lot of the small banks in this space with consent decrees, exactly because they did not manage risk properly).

On the technology front, after building out APIs for core banking systems in the US, we determined that none of the standard offerings met our desire to drive the entire bank with a secure API in a highly performant manner. We have been unimpressed with existing bank infrastructures. Both homegrown (often ancient) systems and the ones provided by vendors like FIS, Fiserv, and Jack Henry cannot fulfill basic requirements around security, auditability, reliability, speed, and usability.

Our core banking system is built using an API-first design. Every operation in the bank is controlled by a secured rest API, with a micro-services architecture on the backend. Because we started from scratch, we built our system with security, reliability, speed, and usability. We are using Clojure, PostgreSQL, Storm, docker, etc [2].

A bank in the United Kingdom

The UK regulatory environment favors more competition in the banking sector. They are actively encouraging new challenger banks. After extensive research, we have decided that it is more capital- and time-efficient to start a bank in the UK and build our wholesale services there with any number of great financial technology customers. We will then come back to the United States, either through a branch or agency (which traditionally emphasizes wholesale commercial banking activities) or through a US-based subsidiary.

By working closely with our UK regulators (the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority), by being competently run, and by proving our business model in the UK, we will be able to return to the United States more easily than we could pivot a purchased bank's model to it. 
 
Additionally, the US is averse to granting new banking licenses, and buying a bank often leads to more headaches than opportunities. (See my post Startup Banking’s Looming Leviathan). 

The long-term opportunities

When we talk to venture capitalists, we talk about the size of the opportunity. We have a small target market (financial technology startups) and also a clear larger target market (the $259 billion a year wholesale banking market). 
 
But I want to touch on something else. I care about the potential social impact of a bank that changes the cost structure of financial services. I want to build a bank that disrupts banking. And not just because I might do well economically, but because it would be one of the most powerful ways for me to help others do well economically.

Many people cannot access financial services because banks simply cannot make money off them. Starting a business, raising one’s family out of poverty, or just saving for a rainy day are all far more difficult without access to a bank. I hope to radically change the equation through our systems, allowing many more people to have access to the financial system.

By creating a platform which makes it cost-effective for smart folks everywhere to build applications, companies, and non-profits that use our services, I believe that we will impact millions of Americans and tens (if not hundreds) of millions of global citizens.

That might sound grandiose, but fixing the banking system is not an abstraction to me. It is what gets me up every morning — and reminds me that even though we likely have to do six or seven nearly impossible things to make this dream of an open, safe, compliant, risk-managed, technologically-enabled, and regulated banking API platform a reality, it is all worth it. 

Footnotes

[1] Once when I was in college, I asked a professor about an unusually short page limit for an assignment. He responded that "to be abstract is not to be vague." I have tried to live up to that notion in this post. There is a lot of abstraction here. Examples include getting regulated in the UK, the particular hardships of getting regulated in the US (whether de novo, purchase, or partnership), capital requirements and how to grow infinitely while following the rules, technical architecture, feature rollout, risk and compliance management, foreign operating licenses (branch, agency, or subsidiary), how we would specifically support individual companies, what social impact for the underbanked would actually look like, and the list goes on, and on, and on. Some of these topics I will write follow-up posts about, while others are secret Standard Treasury sauce. 

 [2] If this sounds interesting to you, email hiring@standardtreasury.com :). Our product engineering team is staying in San Francisco.

Standard Treasury as Bank

At Standard Treasury we are building an API banking platform, becoming our own bank, and doing so in the United Kingdom. I want to address these three aspects of our work and also talk about the long-term social potential for our bank.[1] 

Banking as a platform 

Over the last six years, we have seen a proliferation of startups at the application layer of banking. Some examples include LendingClub, OnDeck, Braintree, Stripe, WePay, Betterment, Wealthfront, Osper, TrueLink, Angelist, Seedrs, GoCardLess, FutureAdvisor, Square, LendUp, etc. 
 
Behind each one of those institutions is a bank. Sometimes these are big banks like Wells Fargo or JP Morgan, while sometimes they are small banks like BanCorp or WebBank. At either size, the technology is terrible at these banks. The interfaces which one has to deal with are foolishly designed, risk and compliance management are often done by hand, and the entire infrastructure often uses legacy technology that makes speed, consistency, and reliability very difficult. 
 
We are building the programatic banking platform which should underlie the new, growing application layer of finance. We want to be the Amazon Web Services of banking. Our wholesale commercial banking infrastructure will be unknown to most of the public, but it will power some of the biggest applications and companies in the world. 

Becoming a bank 

We must be our own regulated, deposit-taking institution in order to build the platform and product we are planning. We have to own the entire regulatory and technology stack.

On the regulatory front, we will be foot-forward on things like risk management, AML detection, sanction-list referencing, etc. We need to understand what our partners are doing and build our technology to work to underwrite and manage our risk. We have to understand our customers (specifically financial technology startups), so that we can help regulators understand our customers. In short, we have to be a purpose built communications layer between our partners and everyone else — including regulators and payment systems. Today, bankers are doing a bad job of this. (In fact, regulators have hit a lot of the small banks in this space with consent decrees, exactly because they did not manage risk properly).

On the technology front, after building out APIs for core banking systems in the US, we determined that none of the standard offerings met our desire to drive the entire bank with a secure API in a highly performant manner. We have been unimpressed with existing bank infrastructures. Both homegrown (often ancient) systems and the ones provided by vendors like FIS, Fiserv, and Jack Henry cannot fulfill basic requirements around security, auditability, reliability, speed, and usability.

Our core banking system is built using an API-first design. Every operation in the bank is controlled by a secured rest API, with a micro-services architecture on the backend. Because we started from scratch, we built our system with security, reliability, speed, and usability. We are using Clojure, PostgreSQL, Storm, docker, etc [2].

A bank in the United Kingdom

The UK regulatory environment favors more competition in the banking sector. They are actively encouraging new challenger banks. After extensive research, we have decided that it is more capital- and time-efficient to start a bank in the UK and build our wholesale services there with any number of great financial technology customers. We will then come back to the United States, either through a branch or agency (which traditionally emphasizes wholesale commercial banking activities) or through a US-based subsidiary.

By working closely with our UK regulators (the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority), by being competently run, and by proving our business model in the UK, we will be able to return to the United States more easily than we could pivot a purchased bank's model to it. 
 
Additionally, the US is averse to granting new banking licenses, and buying a bank often leads to more headaches than opportunities. (See my post Startup Banking’s Looming Leviathan). 

The long-term opportunities

When we talk to venture capitalists, we talk about the size of the opportunity. We have a small target market (financial technology startups) and also a clear larger target market (the $259 billion a year wholesale banking market). 
 
But I want to touch on something else. I care about the potential social impact of a bank that changes the cost structure of financial services. I want to build a bank that disrupts banking. And not just because I might do well economically, but because it would be one of the most powerful ways for me to help others do well economically.

Many people cannot access financial services because banks simply cannot make money off them. Starting a business, raising one’s family out of poverty, or just saving for a rainy day are all far more difficult without access to a bank. I hope to radically change the equation through our systems, allowing many more people to have access to the financial system.

By creating a platform which makes it cost-effective for smart folks everywhere to build applications, companies, and non-profits that use our services, I believe that we will impact millions of Americans and tens (if not hundreds) of millions of global citizens.

That might sound grandiose, but fixing the banking system is not an abstraction to me. It is what gets me up every morning — and reminds me that even though we likely have to do six or seven nearly impossible things to make this dream of an open, safe, compliant, risk-managed, technologically-enabled, and regulated banking API platform a reality, it is all worth it. 

Footnotes

[1] Once when I was in college, I asked a professor about an unusually short page limit for an assignment. He responded that "to be abstract is not to be vague." I have tried to live up to that notion in this post. There is a lot of abstraction here. Examples include getting regulated in the UK, the particular hardships of getting regulated in the US (whether de novo, purchase, or partnership), capital requirements and how to grow infinitely while following the rules, technical architecture, feature rollout, risk and compliance management, foreign operating licenses (branch, agency, or subsidiary), how we would specifically support individual companies, what social impact for the underbanked would actually look like, and the list goes on, and on, and on. Some of these topics I will write follow-up posts about, while others are secret Standard Treasury sauce. 

 [2] If this sounds interesting to you, email hiring@standardtreasury.com :). Our product engineering team is staying in San Francisco.

My Mental Health Story: Depression, Plagiarism, and Analysis

Over the summer, I wrote two articles on mental health and startup founders. One was on how the mental health problems of the founders I know often extend beyond depression and another was about how many founders I know have trauma and mental health issues.

These posts seem to have hit a nerve with a lot of folks, as every week I get a few emails from folks discussing their own struggles with mental illness as founders and asking me to share my story (as promised in both posts). Mental health issues are incredibly common but not talked about enough. They are prevalent almost everywhere and perhaps even more so in Silicon Valley. I hope by sharing my story people might be able to relate to the problem more, share their own stories, or even seek help if they need it.

Taking so Long to Write: Embarrassment and the Too Simple Story

I've really struggled with my write up for two primary reasons.

First, I find my story embarrassing. Not because mental health challenges are embarrassing, but because the critical event that finally forced me to seek help was a prolonged series of stupid mistakes. To mix the illness and the errors together too casually does a disservice to both. I am not sorry for being sick; I am ashamed of my actions. It's the same story, though, and I will trust the reader to have generous intentions.

Secondly, my story ends up tidy. Too linear. Fall, recovery, redemption. It’s true, but it also feels trite to me. I was depressed for a long time. That was terrible. I sought attention by doing something public and stupid. I got caught, I took time off from college, and I went to therapy four times a week for nine months. I had the luxury to address my depression.[1] I made the choice to not take a psychiatric medication, which isn’t an option for many people. I haven't been depressed since. Afterwards I lucked out professionally. So in short, things worked out for me pretty well.

But I have many friends and family members who haven't been so lucky: some have spent years on what clearly in retrospect was the wrong medications or with the wrong diagnosis, some have had terrible times with therapists, some have been hospitalized, some have had their lives put on hold for years, some struggle so profoundly right now that they think their VCs, their employees, or their families would abandon them if any knew their challenges.

Reminder

A month or so ago, a few people sent me a copy of an interview with William Deresiewicz in the Atlantic called The Ivy League, Mental Illness, and the Meaning of Life. The essay touched a number of nerves for me. I was just such a student that he points to: the elite school, the sense of grandiosity, the deep depression, the fear of failure, the strong desire to do more than I was capable of doing, not asking why I was doing things (good and bad), and a very superficial understanding of myself.

That all changed when I took those nine months off from Brown in 2007. I went to therapy four days a week for nine months. I read the entire Contemporary Civilization and Literature Humanities course requirements of the Columbia Great Books curriculum. I built a language of reflection. I asked myself why I was motivated to do the things I did. I changes the trajectory of my mental health and my life.

Crisis

But to get to that utopian outcome, I made an incredibly stupid and embarrassing set of mistakes. I had been a columnist in the Brown Daily Herald, and, over a number of columns and a number of years, I plagiarized. I also plagiarized in a letter to the New York Times.

This ended up being a very important moment in my life. I had been depressed for several years before then. My therapists later described my condition as "long-lasting, complex, deep and persistent."

It's easy to say that my depression had it's root in a complicated relationship with my mother when I was young, or in being raised by my dad from ages ten to eighteen. As I wrote elsewhere:

In my case, my parents had me when they were incredibly young and promptly got divorced. I lived with my mother, an alcoholic, until I was ten. At that point, we had gotten in so many drinking-related car accidents together, that my stepfather was asking for a divorce and child welfare agencies demanded I move to live with my father. I didn’t see my mother again for eight years.

It can also be too easy to cast simple stories for complex realities. It can be easy to blame someone or something. It's not particularly useful, though -- it can often just be a shorthand to describe things to other people. There was some interaction of my childhood and everything else I'm sure of: not feeling completely at home at Brown, coming from such a humble background[2], not being comfortable with my weight[3], being popular in high school, but never being sure why that was, moving four times as a child and feeling like an outsider frequently, etc., etc.

I had what therapists call dysthymia. It's a mild but long-lasting form of depression. It was not so severe that I could not go to school or have outward success. In fact, I had too much of the outside world, I was successful. However, under it all were symptoms of fatigue, despair, trouble concentrating, overeating, and a sense of worthlessness. I did not know where to turn and my friends did not know how to help. I could not identify my problem and had no idea how to treat it.

Depression can be simplified too far. Often, when people are talking or thinking about depression they oscillate between two characterizations: one being severe depression and the other being the blues, a mild today-is-not-a-good-day mood. However, what I suffered was in between those ends. As my therapist put it once, it was a "low-grade, smoldering bad depression". I cannot recall, late in my high school years or during my college years, a time when I was happy -— at least in the ways others describe happiness.

Plagiarism came from a hope to get the help (I knew deep down) I needed. This is not to excuse my actions -- I think they're inexcusable -- but merely to explain them: In my own head, I needed to find a way to get someone to notice that I was unwell and unhappy, not moving through life as fine as I seemed. Many might turn to alcohol or drugs, but my outlet was as subtle as my condition. It was as self-destructive, too.

When talking to a boss about this, years later, she noted that "plagiarism just comes from laziness, and you would have to do a lot to convince me otherwise." In all but one case I was not lazy though, I wrote almost every sentence with my own ideas but then, hoping that I would get caught, I would add a sentence or two verbatim from an outside source. In retrospect, it does not make any sense. I sought attention, not for glory, but in the hope that someone would say to me that I had a problem, and would help me.

I did get caught. I did get help. I did get exactly what I wanted: for my world to fall apart and for me to build a new one, built on a better foundation.

Reflection

Analysis was a life-changing experience for me.

I began by finding a therapist that I jived with well. Not an easy task anywhere, made harder by living over an hour from the nearest city. Finding her, we agreed upon a commitment of four days a week.

So began the most difficult time of my life: a slow exploration of who I was, what I had done, and a difficult childhood. Every day, I traveled an hour and half, each way, to go through talk therapy. The drives themselves became part of the therapy. Beforehand, I would think about what I wanted to talk about that day. While on the drive back I would reflect on, or "consolidate", what I had talked about.

We named the problem. I remember the moment I said to myself, "I am depressed and it is treatable." Comfortable with this prognosis, I made the personal choice to avoid medication. Although nothing came easily or simply, we talked through the various destructive behaviors in my life.

There is no easy way to explain my analysis. It was slow: somehow both methodical and chaotic. Sometimes nothing much would happen in a session, sometimes a lot of progress would be made and I was upset the hour was over. It's exhausting. It's hard work. It can be yelling or crying. Sometimes my therapist seemed like my best friend, sometimes incredibly distant. Neither is factual but both were true for me.

A lot of work in therapy is, in a way, getting to know yourself. It was learning about my past, sometimes remembering things long forgotten. Acquiring a sense of why I do the things I do, where they came from. Sometimes all of this is simply labeled cognitions or "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses." Mental action is a nice way of putting it while in practical reality it can be a pretty brutal process to figure things out.

And that goes on. Four days a week, every week for months. There were rarely big revelations. One day doesn't seem much better or worse than the last, but one month to the next often seem better. Slowly, steadily, I was feeling better. I was more emotionally and physically active. I was growing to know myself better.

It was also a moment where I had a uniquely large amount of time on my hands and could read all those books. At the time I thought I was just using my spare time wisely, but, in retrospect, reading those books was part of my therapy. The Iliad is about wounded pride and hubris. Hard to read the Confessions without thinking of one's own sinful youth, as it were.

Where I Am At Today

It's been almost seven years now and I can't underestimate how helpful it is to seek help and address one's issues, no matter how hard that might be. Today it can almost be hard to relate to who I was before the analysis. All in all, I appreciate how far I have come, how differently I feel, and how happy I am that I went through the process, especially at that fairly young age.

I would not say I know myself fully, but through analysis I gained a much better idea of how I feel and why I feel the way I feel. My friends who knew me, before and after, noticed that I became a little more quiet, a little more thoughtful, a lot happier, and much surer of myself, not in arguments or intellectually, but in a deeper, who I am, sense.

Mental Health Beyond Myself

Stigma around mental illness, which is pervasive through academic and success-driven communities, is difficult to overcome. Sometimes, I feel like I should be a mini spokesman around mental illness. One in four students in college is clinically depressed at some point in their college career. I was one of them. I wouldn't be surprised if the numbers are similar among startup founders, and even though I haven't been depressed in over six years, I sort of wish I could do more to support those folks. To help them seek treatment without a crisis like the one I manufactured for myself.

People need to be more candid about mental illness. They need to be more forward. They need to be less embarrassed -- it isn't something to be embarrassed about.

More people need to have more understanding and acceptance. To do that, people need to speak up. The treatment around mental illness in this country could use a lot of help, which is difficult when it's so hard to talk about it publicly.

And on, and on, and on. My depression's public manifestation is the worst thing I've ever done in my life. It makes me feel like I am the wrong person to push these issues much farther. But maybe it gives me the ability to be more public about my mental health. Maybe I can work to address these problems by creating a discourse and finding ways to help.

Side Note: Consequences

I am not going to plagiarize again. It's a stupid, now unnecessary thing to do, and I obviously write so much now that these essays are unmanageably long. But I wouldn't take back the plagiarism, per se. It was a necessary precondition to get the help I needed.

It was a very important, if overly public, period of my life. It's the fourth or fifth link on a Google Search for my name, so it definitely comes up.

Obviously, I've since gotten in to Y Combinator, convinced people to work with me on building Standard Treasury, and gotten normal jobs/internships at Stripe, the City of Newark[4], Bennett Midland, and the US Department of State[5] as well as fellowships at Harvard and NYU. In all of these situations, I've had to discuss this history in a lot of detail with my employers.

On the other hand, there are some jobs I have been seriously considered for that I haven't gotten -- particularly government appointments, both for the Federal Government and the City of New York -- because, well, I did do something very stupid and very public in college. Although most people's reaction seems to be that we all do stupid things in college, most avoid doing them so publicly.

I do hope to, one day, hold another position of public trust beyond being Mayor Booker's Senior Technology Policy Advisor, but that might be a hard thing to do.


Footnotes

[1] I moved to live with my father, who was incredibly supportive. He had moved to teach in Kansas and had an extra bedroom. My maternal grandmother gave me some money for food, etc., and my therapist saw me for nearly free during her lunch hour. I was also 22 and had no real responsibilities to anyone really.

[2] Things got complicated here. When I was growing up, my Dad was a postal clerk and my mother a waitress/chef. When I was fourteen, Dad went back to get a BA at Rutgers and then stayed on there for an MA and PhD. This leads to two simultaneous complications: (1) My Dad and I intellectually matured at the same time and (2) My Dad made...whatever PhD students make...until months before I took time off to go to therapy. I grew up in a small, working class town in New Jersey and without very much money: Brown was a culture shock for me in some ways.

[3] See Losing 58.3 Lbs for Science

[4] Part of my job in Newark was to break some eggs, so, one of my adversaries leaked my appointment and plagiarism to the New Jersey press. Some folks chatted with Mayor Booker's Chief of Staff and Chief Policy Advisor, and everyone decided it was a non-story.

[5] I applied for my internship at the Department of State before leaving Brown in 2007. They let me know in May 2008 that they'd like to do my security clearance. I passed the clearance and showed up for an internship, after deciding with my therapist that I was ready. On the third or fourth day, I told my bosses at the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Quite conveniently, they were all Christians and Bush-appointees, and they definitely responded to the story as one of redemption. Ultimately, they thought hard about firing me, but felt that if I had worked so hard to put my personal life in order then they would help me put my professional life in order. That, they did: it definitely mattered to the first person who hired me after college that I had that internship after the plagiarism.